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Abstract 
During the 2010-2012 sovereign crisis EU institutions discussed the Fiscal Union as an option for solving the economic 
recession. This idea was abandoned because the member states were not prepared to give up their fiscal sovereignty. 
This debate is not new. The evolution of public finance theory went through many recurrences of the basic questions. During a 
150 year period between the end of the 18th century and the First World War no less than four schools of thought on public 
finance have emerged – the English, the French, the Italian and the German. These four schools presented different views on the 
three main issues of public finance: who is the state in relation with the individuals; which is the reason for paying taxes; what 
can a state do when it does not have enough resources. 
This paper assesses Acestthe question of the Fiscal Union difficulties by invoking the different traditions in Europe regarding the 
main issues of the public finance. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
The fiscal union was considered an option to overcome the 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. This 
idea was abandoned or delayed due to the opposition based either on the fact that euro area member states were not 
ready to give up their fiscal sovereignty or that EU member states regarded the fiscal union as weakening the 
decision power at EU level, as the Swedish minister of finance warned (Milne, 2013). 
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The fiscal union concept was regarded as an intermediary step towards the political union but it was not defined 
clearly. The literature argues that a coordinated fiscal policy, the kind that exists in federal states, has at least four 
traits: a common set of fiscal rules, a mechanism of fiscal intervention, a mechanism of fiscal balancing and 
transfers, and a common budget (Vetter, 2013). The debates on the fiscal union during the above mentioned period 
concentrated on the practical aspects of implementing these four key characteristics in the euro area member states. 
One issue that was ignored in this debate was the fiscal tradition of each member state of the EU and the euro 
area. Fiscal rules and budgets do not simply pop out of the laws enforced by governments. These rules are accepted 
by citizens and companies to the extent that they respect certain conventions particular to each society and which 
incorporate the historical evolution of each state. These conventions can explain the different degree of acceptance 
from country to country of tax rates or the degree of acceptance of state invasion of individual’s wellbeing through 
different types of taxes.  
The fiscal tradition refers to the essential questions of public finance – who is the state vis-à-vis the individual; 
why do individuals have to pay taxes; what can a state do when it does not have enough resources to cover its needs. 
The employment of only one type on analysis of macroeconomic and budget balance or budgetary construction 
(be it the one accepted by the EU or the one used by the IMF) artificially induces the idea that all countries share the 
same concepts on the nature of the state and of public finance. 
In Europe four fiscal traditions crystalized until the First World War. These four traditions offer different answers 
on the essential questions of public finance. The German cameralist tradition considered the state as the support of 
society’s development; hence taxation was an extraordinary event. The state obtained its revenues from the income 
yielded by the properties it owned and administered like any other entrepreneur. The classic liberalism believed the 
state to be the enemy of private initiative; hence the state involvement in the economy, including taxation, had to be 
repressed. Taxes were supposed to affect only the income and not the capital. The public finance in Italy, although 
an offspring of the German cameralism, considered the parliament as the main decision maker in terms of taxation; 
hence the state had to participate on the market as an equal actor with the private ones both in terms of resource 
formation and production. The Swedish tradition too considered the parliament as the main decision maker on 
taxation but it introduced strict rules on decisions and had a preference for direct taxation. 
This paper aims to describe in the next four sections the characteristics of each of these four traditions of public 
finance and then to conclude by reflecting on the chances of a fiscal union under these circumstances. Considering 
the complex evolution of the notion of “state” during the three century period studied the notions of 
state/sovereign/government/monarch are considered to have an analogous meaning. 
2. The German cameralism  
The cameralism represented a preoccupation for the practical aspects of a territory administration and 
concentrated on the maintenance and growth of a society. Thus, the cameralists were less interested in the political 
aspects of government but concerned with helping all members of society to increase their incomes, the state being 
just the means that allowed for everyone’s wellbeing.   
A category of bureaucrats called cameralists developed on the territory of the Holly Roman Empire after the year 
1500 (Wagner, 2012). Their expertise covered a vast array of subjects – political science, history, administration, 
legislation, etc. 
The difference between the cameralism and the ideas of economics and public finance that developed afterwards 
on the European continent is that the former does not adopt the view on the state as a Leviathan. The cameralism 
considered the state the expression of the needs of its inhabitants and consequently the state was not above residents’ 
needs. 
Based on these ideas, the cameralism treated the budget as the balance sheet of a household according to the 
mediaeval version of the “kammera”, which referred to the administration of the “villa” of the prince. In a 
framework of a state represented as the common effort, it was the state that had to make the investments necessary 
to everyone’s wellbeing.  
The contribution of cameralism to the economic thinking is minor because there was no economics but a 
collection of ideas about the administration of the household between the 16th and 17th centuries. The interest of 
those studying the community was the relationship between the members of the society and not economic facts 
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(Small, 1909). 
The cameralists of the 18th century considered taxation as part of economics. The most important theoreticians of 
the 18th century cameralism were Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi and Joseph von Sonnenfels. They moved the 
interest of cameralism from the prince’s happiness to the population growth. Von Justi maintained that cameralism 
was a science researching the economic basis of common good in order to understand how to increase the tax base 
which was to be further used for enhancing the common good. 
Von Justi became famous in the history of public finance for formulating before Adam Smith a set of rules on 
taxation. These were more complex than Smith’s ones and probably better because they had been verified by the 
cameralists in their everyday practice. Besides the four rules that will later appear in Smith’s book (equity, 
transparency, facility and efficiency) von Justi came with two other. These specified that a tax should not deprive a 
taxpayers of the everyday necessities or curtail his capital, and that a tax should not affect the taxpayer’s wellbeing 
or to infringe his civil liberties. 
Von Sonnenfels continued the cameralist tradition of classifying the taxes in two categories – ordinary and 
extraordinary. He claimed that the state should borrow money only from its citizens because this led to wealth 
increase through capital reinvestment (Bonney, 2002).  
Cameralism considered that the main sources of revenue for the public finance were the land, owned by the state 
as forests and mines, and the enterprises owned and administered by the state. Taxes were considered an exceptional 
source of income and represented only a fraction of total revenues (Backhaus and Wagner, 2005). 
Because the Holly Roman Empire was politically fragmented cameralists favoured the increase of the economic 
capacity through projects financed from the revenues of the monopolies owned by the prince. The state was 
considered equal to any other company participating in the production and transactions on the market. Moreover, the 
cameralists opposed the taxation of property because it eroded the essence of economic growth and it deprived the 
population. They also argued against custom duties because such taxes restricted access to goods.  
The German researches in public finance from the 19th and 20th centuries did not trouble to justify taxation 
because the German cameralism was interested more in the way public money was spent. Thus, the 19th century 
German cameralists were interested in how to define the fiscal economy, the economy of the public sector. 
The most important cameralist of the 19th century was Adolph Wagner. He formulated a principle that was later 
named after him – Wagner’s Law – stating that as a country develops the state’s participation in the economy 
(measured as the share of national income that the state uses) grows. Wagner was important most of all because he 
examined three of the issues that obsessed the public finance theory since the mediaeval time – the distinction 
between the public revenues and expenditures, the sovereign’s right to tax and the public debt.  
Wagner’s view on public finance was built on the idea of the state as an entity with two profiles. Wagner’s 
thinking was liberal in essence and resembled that of Say because Wagner saw the state as being useful for the 
common good since it helped to achieve the goals of the community. In the same time, the state like any other entity 
in a community had the freedom to follow its own interests. 
Wagner put this double nature of the state in perspective and interpreted sovereignty vis-à-vis the subjects of the 
state. This was the basis for the two types of actions the state had. The first type of actions resulted from the needs 
of the community members, since the establishment of a state was the answer to the needs individuals as community 
had. The second type of actions resulted from the needs the state, as a separate entity, had and these needs did not 
relate to the individual’s needs (Wagner, 1967). This second type of actions was the one the state was able to 
perform based on fiscal sovereignty.  
Therefore, Wagner limited the object of public finance to the question of how to finance those actions of the state 
that did not relate to citizens’ needs. He listed three conditions fiscal policy had to fulfil in order for the society to 
gain control on the state’s actions. The first condition was that the parliament exercises an “efficient and strict” 
fiscal control (Wagner, 1967). 
The second condition was to follow the economic principle known as Wagner’s Law, whereas the state’s 
expenditures were proportional to the value of the services the state supplied. Wagner argued that this law was in 
fact a prudential rule that allowed the control of state’s expenditures. Wagner’s Law was not a rule that gave a 
reason for increased state intrusion in the economy, as his detractors claimed, but in fact was a rule that allowed for 
checking it since the community decided on the value of the services supplied by the state, as stated by the first 
condition. Indeed, Wagner himself made this clear in presenting the third condition related to the balance between 
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the fiscal needs and the national income. He considered the extreme case of state’s expenditures heightened to the 
extent that they stifle the rest of the economy. His answer was that such developments were acceptable only in 
extreme and transitory national emergencies (Wagner, 1967).  
Wagner defined “fiscal economy” as that part of the economy where the state was both a receiver of resources 
through taxation and a producer of goods and services for its own use as well as for that of the community at large. 
The public expenditures were those that arose because the bureaucratic apparatus functioned in order to supply the 
community with goods and services. These expenditures resulted from paying personnel with certain qualifications 
or from buying certain necessary to the nation. These expenditures were covered from taxation revenues.  
Wagner presented a different perspective on the public debt having in mind the historical reality of state 
consolidation. In his view the state could contract perpetual debts since it has an unlimited existence in time. 
The main opponent of Wagner within the cameralist tradition was his contemporary Lorenz von Stein. The major 
difference between the two scholars revolved around the importance they attached to public expenditures, Wagner 
attributing limited importance to them in the classical tradition of the cameralism. Von Stein tried to demonstrate 
that there must be a constitutional framework to justify taxation because otherwise the state could destroy the very 
community it collected taxes on behalf of.  
Von Stein considered taxation strictly linked to the existence of the state. The state, which von Stein defined as 
an association of free equal individuals, was the expression of the realization that individuals have a double nature – 
individual and collective. The economic expression of that realization was taxation (von Stein, 1967).  
One of the original points von Stein had on public finance was about the canons of taxation. He claimed that the 
two basic elements of private economy – capital and the income it yields – should be taxed differently. Instead of 
Smith’s four canons, von Stein proposes three propositions on “the economic principle of taxation”. The first one, 
on tax base, stated that taxation should not affect the capital, the basis of the private economy. The second 
proposition, on the scope of taxation, underlines that whatever the object of a tax, the tax should only be imposed on 
revenues; hence any other contributions a state asked for could not be called taxes. The last proposition, on the tax 
level, showed that the rate of a tax should not erode the income to the extent that it did not increase the initial 
capital, because otherwise it endangered the future growth of the nation (von Stein, 1967). 
To sum up, the German cameralism promoted the idea of a state that existed only to protect the capacity of its 
subjects to contribute to the growth of the society and of the taxes that were exceptional events that should not erode 
the capacity (capital) of individuals to contribute to the development of the community. 
3. The classic liberal tradition 
The progress of the public finance thinkers from England and France during the 18th and 19th centuries consists in 
defining the scope of the government (expenditures). As the complexity of the role of government in society evolved 
it was necessary to clarify its increasing financial power as well as the relationship between the taxpayer and the 
sovereign who imposed those taxes. Moreover, during this period thinkers debated on the areas of economic activity 
that had to be taxed and the way taxes had to be constructed (in terms of the type of taxes – be they direct or 
indirect-, the number of taxes and the rate of each tax). One of the ideas that these thinkers considered to be a source 
of stability for the public finance and for the economy in general did not make it into the 20th century - not taxing 
capital, since this was the basis for starting a new economic cycle. 
The main difference in terms of public finance between the classic liberalism in England or France and other 
traditions discussed in this article is the interest for the relationship between the individual and the state. The classic 
liberalism as far as the political philosophy is concerned evolved along the lines of thinking set by authors like 
Hobbes (limited the sovereign’s expenditures to those concerned with internal order and security but the taxpayers 
were not able to oppose taxation); Locke (did not reject taxation as long as the majority accepted it, since this was 
the only way to preserve the individual’s fundamental right to property); Montesquieu (fathered the separation of 
political powers and defined freedom in such  a way that any tax which violated freedom – especially the direct ones 
and mostly the taxes on land – was not acceptable); Mirabeau (argued against private tax collection of indirect taxes 
because it decreased the efficiency of the collection process). 
Mirabeau came up with a number of principles for the tax collection and these heralded Adam Smith’s four 
canons of taxation. Thus, Mirabeau argued in favour of equitable fiscal burden. He maintained that it was the 
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income size that determined the tax and not the other way around. He claimed that the tax must go as close as 
possible to the source of income and it had to be proportional with the income. Finally, tax collection was not to 
increase the fiscal burden (Bonney, 2002). 
In the last quarter of the 18th century Adam Smith published his famous research into the wealth of nation. The 
last of the five books investigates the subjects of government revenues, expenditures and public debt. Smith, a 
follower of Locke’s theory of natural rights maintained that the state had only four legitimate functions that had to 
be financed through taxation because they benefited the entire society. Smith agreed on this point with the German 
cameralists because the four functions were national defence, justice, universal access to education and “good 
roads”. 
Smith contended that there had to be only two types of taxes –on luxury goods and on revenues obtained from 
land ownership. He considered other commonly used taxes like excises, custom taxes or profit taxes inefficient 
because they either had too high administrative costs in terms of collection (as with custom duties) or they 
discouraged production (as was the case of profit tax). Smith opposed custom duties because they distorted trade 
since they were too high, they curtailed consumption and they encouraged smuggling. He also criticised the taxes on 
wage and profit. He explained that such taxes hijacked resources from value creating activities and in turn led to 
manufactured goods price increases (that exceeded the value of the tax). 
Moreover, Smith opposed taxes for encouraging certain regions or industries because he demonstrated that such 
taxes altered the natural direction of the national industry and turned it to a less profitable one. 
Smith’s major contribution to public finance was to come up with the four canons of taxation he considered 
essential for taxation not to alter the wealth of nation. The canon of equity reflects Smith’s opinion that the 
wealthiest members of a society benefited the most out of the state’s activities and therefore they afforded to pay 
more taxes. The canon of transparency allowed for the tax collection system to preserve credibility despite the fact 
there were unscrupulous taxmen. The canon of convenience followed from Smith’s wish to have a simple tax system 
in England. The canon of efficiency postulated that the administrative costs plus the distortions taxation produced in 
the economy had to be minimized. 
Unlike Smith, David Ricardo did not dwell on public expenditures and the necessity of the individual’s 
contribution to the commonwealth. He analysed different types of taxes in 11 out of the 32 chapters of his book. At 
the beginning of the eighth chapter Ricardo defined the tax as a part of the production of the land or of the work that 
is given to the government. It must be underlined that Ricardo considered that a tax had to be imposed only on the 
revenues of a production factor. Ricardo argued that taxing the production factor endangered the future production 
cycle. 
John Stuart Mill became the most famous economist after Adam Smith once his “Principles” was published 
(Ekelund and Hébert, 1972). Mill discussed in the fifth book of the “Principles” two types of government functions 
– the necessary ones, which were intrinsic to the notion of government and the optional ones, on which there was no 
general agreement. Mill did not make any sort of link between the state’s functions and taxation and in the second 
chapter discussed the concept of taxation, starting from Smith four canons. He considered Smith’s principles 
sufficient both from the point of view of the tax rate as from that of the way tax collection was enforced. He 
considered necessary an examination of the first canon – that of equity. In his view, the necessity of taxation equity 
was coming from the Enlightenment principle according to which a government should not discriminate among its 
subjects based on their social class. The burden of government had to be equally disbursed onto the community 
members as to be minimized overall the society. 
Mill’s acceptance for a role of the government in the economy did not imply he favoured taxation. On the 
contrary, in the eighth chapter of the fifth book Mill argued that excessive taxation, without defining a certain level 
from which taxation becomes burdensome, was “evil” for the economy. 
Before Mill wrote on government and taxes Jean Baptiste Say articulated a less complex but closer to everyday 
practice on the public economy and taxes. Say, like the public finance experts from Germany and Italy, considered 
that the community and not the state was an active participant in the economic activities. Say spoke about the public 
side of the economy in the last book of his “Treaty”, the one that analyses the consumption. 
Say argued in the first chapter of the third book that the public field referred to the community founded as a 
group of individuals. This community developed needs that were unique and it fell within the realm of the public 
economy to deal with those needs. Say did not discuss either the object of forming this community or the relation 
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between the individual and the community, but he did enumerate some of the unique services of the community, 
different from those of the individual members: services rendered by the priests, the security generated by soldiers, 
judicial and legal services delivered by judges and lawyers who defended rights against other individual’s 
aggression.  
Starting from those concepts Say criticised the representation of a tax as payment for the effort a state employee 
made. He argued that such a definition of tax was wrong because the money amount paid by the taxpayer did not 
have a counterpart. He considered in turn that the state used this amount to buy the time and skills of public sector 
employees who “produce” the services delivered to the community. 
Using that definition of taxes Say managed to bring both public and private sectors on the market and that 
allowed for the supply and demand to determine the price of goods and services. Say warned that it was the 
definition of tax as a reward for the state’s effort that opened the door to excess from the state (higher taxes, 
corruption, etc.). 
 In the eighth chapter of the third book Say concentrated on taxes and contended that the political economy had to 
consider taxes as a given and not as a right which had to be discussed in terms of who has the right to impose them. 
The conception that Pierre Paul Leroy-Beaulieu had on the subject of the state was similar to German cameralism 
because he said that the only income sources for a state were the goods that it owned privately or the amounts it 
collected from its subjects as taxes. Moreover, Beaulieu took over from the theory of the dominion state (a typical 
view of the French public finance theory) the idea that taxes were the counterpart for the services rendered by the 
state to its subjects. 
The novelty that the French author brought to this idea was the concept of the tax as a sort of subscription for the 
services delivered by the state. The concept of subscription implied a sort of a contractual relationship. This made 
room to introduce the state in the economic realm alongside the private enterprises. Beaulieu stated that the fact that 
the state supplied certain services paid for through contributions imposed using the coercion showed that the private 
sector was not able to deliver such services.  
Beaulieu did not make any consideration on the state and its role. He asserted that the state needed financial 
resources and the objective of the public finance was to show the possible solutions that did not infringe individuals’ 
rights and interests as well as justice. He considered public finance as a science of state revenues and the ways they 
can be acquired. 
To sum up, the classic liberal tradition, which was embedded in the ideas concerning the state – at least in 
England and other European states that copied the Anglo-Saxon tradition (Denmark, Norway), but not in France – 
preferred taxation of income to that of capital (wealth), direct taxes to indirect ones (because allows for a strict 
control of the individual over the state) and a lower level of indirect taxes rates.    
4. The Italian tradition 
The state had a clearly defined and mostly utilitarian role in the economy as understood by the Italian economists 
of the 19th century. Their perspective was rooted in the idea of the state as an “enlightened and benevolent despot”. 
The Italian economists of the 19th century analysed the state as an economic agent that was both a producer of 
collective goods created in order to be incorporated in the production of the private economy, as well as an 
optimizing agent, as it looked to maximize its revenues. 
The Italian tradition of public finance, like the German one, continued to consider public finance as an 
independent science, despite the fact that it encompassed the new tools (marginalism) developed by the economic 
theory and that the French and English thinkers considered public finance a component of economics. Because of 
this specificity, the Italian cameralism argued that public expenditures are charted by the manner in which political 
power is carried out.  
This interest in politics came from the conviction Italian cameralist had that the state as producer of goods and 
services was not situated outside the economic realm. It was the individuals who decided based on costs if a good or 
service was to be supplied by the private sector or by the state. The decision was made politically within a 
representative body considering that there was no unanimity in judging the cost (Wagner, 1997). 
One of the best explanations for making public finance decisions through party politics within the parliament was 
given by Maffeo Pantaleoni. Nevertheless, he was not interested in politics itself or a specific pattern of collective 
418   Amalia Fugaru /  Procedia Economics and Finance  22 ( 2015 )  412 – 421 
action as it was the case with Wicksell.  
Pantaleoni considered that the decision regarding the allocation of budgetary revenues was made through the 
“average intelligence” of the parliament members because of the design of the budgetary process. Pantaleoni argued 
that the parliament members did no express a vote on public interest or the cost of a certain project but the marginal 
utility of each expenditure item (Pantaleoni, 1967).   
Another important contribution of the Italian tradition concerned the price of goods and services produced by the 
public economy. Ugo Mazzola came up with a theory that still is part of the public finance textbooks. He analysed 
the characteristics of the public goods and the issue of consumer surplus for public goods. 
Mazzola’s starting point was the view that the state existed to produce certain goods and services individuals 
needed which were complementary to those produced by the private economy. Mazzola’s understanding was that 
public goods did not have an intrinsic utility but that it was derived through the complement they gave to the 
consumption of privately produced goods. In other words, a public good had no utility for a citizen unless he was 
able to use it in order to follow his own private interests.  
Mazzola implicitly concluded that public goods utility always equalled their price. He pinned down this 
“supreme law of fiscal economy” by describing the two characteristics of public goods – indivisibility and services 
utility and the consolidation of public needs. Mazzola came with a much needed qualification which discouraged 
any attempt from the government to arbitrarily set the price of public goods. He insisted that the essence of the 
supreme law of fiscal economy was the principle of utility maximization. Although it was true that the utility of 
public goods equalled their price it did not mean that the state was able to arbitrarily fix any price (and consequently 
to arbitrarily decide on the distribution of taxes) because the need for such goods and services could also vanish 
(Mazzola, 1967). 
To sum up, the Italian tradition translated taxation into marginalism (economic thought) and considered that the 
parliament was the rightful institution to discuss the sovereign’s right to impose taxation.     
5. The Swedish tradition 
Knut Wicksell was the most important representative of the Swedish public finance tradition. He was a tough 
critic of the cameralist theory of public finance both German and Italian. The main points of disagreement were that 
Wicksell considered absolutely impracticable the supreme law of fiscal economy formulated by Mazzola and he also 
thought that the German cameralist theory based on Wagner’s idea was utterly communist (Wicksell, 1967). 
Wicksell came with an element of novelty on which he based his critique of the cameralism - the principle of 
approximate unanimity and the voluntary consent in taxation. 
Wicksell’s principle started from the assumption that the state and the public sector were the expression of 
general needs; hence a public expenditure had to address a need of the entire society. Therefore, such expenditure 
had to be recognised by all social classes in order to be approved. In an ideal situation, there was unanimity in the 
parliament regarding a certain expenditure item, but in reality Wicksell argued that the unanimity was marginally 
achieved through negotiations of the interests of those who were able to migrate among their needs. This he called 
the principle of approximate unanimity. That principle drew Wicksell closer to the Italian tradition and especially to 
Pantaleoni’s point of view.  
The main consequence of that principle was that the distribution of revenues from taxes to finance the public 
expenditures was not predetermined (as it was in a public budget) since the unanimity for expenditure item was not 
a certainty. Another outcome of that principle was that for each expenditure item there had to be a source of 
financing and there was no such thing as uncovered expenditure. 
Wicksell underlined though the fact that the increasing popularity of indirect taxation had severed the link 
between public revenues and expenditures and therefore the importance of the principle was weakened.  
The voluntary consent in taxation sprang from Wicksell’s deep conviction that any contribution made under 
coercion was “always an evil in itself” (Wicksell, 1967). The contribution to the public economy was entirely the 
choice of the individual based on his conceptions regarding the obligations towards the community.  
The voluntary consent was also a result of the economic nature of the expenditures necessary in order to achieve 
the welfare of the community since they implied economies of scale (Wicksell, 1967). Indeed, if only the 
community was able to supply a certain good or service then the community became a monopoly and had high costs, 
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no matter what the demand elasticity, but it also had the capacity to generate economies of scale. Voicing such 
opinions Wicksell was obviously in agreement with Mazzola’s view on the characteristic of public goods. 
Wicksell showed that if his principle was accepted then the level of the tax rate was no longer a matter for debate 
among the different groups expressing class interests – the government and the parliament. That idea was a critique 
that Wicksell pointed to Wagner because the latter identified the parliament with the demand on the public economy 
market and the government as the supply side, without discussing the main aspect of this so called market – the 
price of the products that are exchanged (Wicksell, 1967).  
Wicksell used the price of the public goods produced by the public economy in order to criticise Mazzola and his 
supreme principle on the grounds that practice invalidated it. Wicksell argued that it was impossible for 
complementary goods to lack intrinsic value because otherwise none would pay for them in the hope that other 
would do and in the end there would be no public economy left. 
Overall, Wicksell was concerned that the science of public finance was lagging behind and that public finance 
was in reality conducted on the principles of the absolutist state. Thus, in Wicksell’s view cameralist public finance 
was hooked on the idea of an enlightened despot who tried to use the revenues from his own properties in order to 
maximise total utility in the sense of moderating the wealth inequality. Wicksell pointed that this type of public 
finance did not allow the assessment of public activity through analysing the degree to which the activity of the state 
rewarded the individual for the sacrifice made by paying the tax (Wicksell, 1967). 
Moreover, this tended to preserve the architecture of fiscal policy dominated by indirect taxes which amputated 
the significance of the consent of the individual. Wicksell used that idea to criticise the German cameralism and 
especially Wagner who was in favour of private activities of the state. Wicksell considered an illusion Wagner’s 
opinion that the revenues from the private activities of the state could be used to reduce other taxes because he 
considered that such capital could be more efficiently employed by private investors. 
Finally, the main dividing line between the German cameralism and Wicksell had to do with taxation principles. 
The theory and practice of public finance since Antiquity rested on the idea of the taxation proportional to the 
capacity to pay, in other words the equality of the sacrifice for the community.  
Wicksell disagreement was rooted in his classic liberal thinking wherein the state was considered a Leviathan. He 
considered that the basis for taxation had to be the benefit that each individual received through the actions of the 
state, in other words the equality between the values submitted through taxation and received through the state 
actions. Based on this idea he criticised the German cameralism and especially Wagner’s point that any activity 
generating a satisfaction for the community higher than the price the community pays for its production had to be 
moved into the public economy domain. Wicksell highlighted the danger that the decision on such activities was not 
based on unanimity and the minority’s sacrifice was never rewarded. Therefore, Wicksell argued that Wagner’s 
proposal led “to communism in the worst sense of the word” (Wicksell, 1967). 
6. Conclusions 
The four fiscal traditions can be condensed in four phrases. The classic liberal tradition would like a strong 
individual facing the state; small and rather direct taxes, imposed on the income rather than the wealth. The German 
tradition perceives the state as a partner for the individuals, both working for a common goal – social development; 
taxes are considered an exception and they should not meddle with individuals’ actions. The Italian tradition views 
the state as an equal player alongside individuals and companies in the market for the production and consumption 
of goods and services; hence, taxes are necessary only when the state provides for goods or services that the market 
cannot. The Swedish tradition discusses public finance especially from the point of view of decision making and 
considers that taxes should be imposed only when all individuals in a community agree to it and there is an 
exclusive preference for direct taxes. 
Although there are several common traits among the four traditions, as described in the previous sections 
(especially no taxation on the capital), their main features highlights the presence of at least one fundamental 
divergence. This refers to the attitude toward the state (defined as the entity that imposes the tax). The views are 
conflicting be it because the state is rejected in the classic liberal tradition, or it is limited in the Swedish one, or 
because the state is a competitor in the Italian tradition, or is an entity to work together with in the German 
cameralist one. 
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The question is how it would be possible to finance a budget at EU level (one of the four elements of a 
coordinated fiscal policy) considering on one hand that such revenues come from the taxation of the subjects of a 
sovereign and on the other hand that the EU member states have such diverse traditions regarding the attitude 
toward the sovereign (the state). The argument that in the case of federal states the whole process is easier does not 
hold since federal states are constituted too as national states. 
In other words, the question is if nation states can get in the way of a fiscal union because of the above mentioned 
traditions. The modern history of Europe offers the example of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, made up of at least a 
dozen nations, which had at least two types of public finances coordinated from the two capitals, with just a couple 
of fields for which the taxes were centralized in Vienna (internal affairs and defence) the rest of the taxes being a 
local affair. Mention must be made that the Empire was a single state entity (albeit one that recognized a number of 
nationalities leaving under its umbrella) and not a federation of nation states. 
One possible answer is one that is already in use and it was proposed to be deepened – increasing the 1 per cent 
VAT revenues quota that each member state already sends to the EU budget. However, the fiscal traditions above 
mentioned show that an indirect tax does not represent a steadfast link between a sovereign and a subject. Thus, it is 
likely that EU citizens will feel closer to the “sovereign” should an indirect tax decrease and be replaced by a direct 
tax (one that encompasses citizens’ relationship with the united Europe) imposed by Brussels.  
The German cameralism encapsulates a philosophy that is much closer to the state structure of the EU. This 
comes from the fact that the German cameralism was a type of public finance practiced in a period when the 
sovereign was keenly interested in being accepted by his subjects in order to preserve his independence vis-à-vis 
neighbouring sovereigns. In that period it was very easy for a sovereign to lose the trust of his subjects if taxes were 
considered too high or if investments considered of general interest were not made. It must be underlined that in the 
time of cameralism fiscal policy represented a tool for the public administration and not an element defining the 
sovereignty of a political entity.  
To sum up, another possible answer that should be debated at the EU level is the evolution of the nation states in 
such a way that they are able to express their sovereignty in other fields than that of fiscal policy. 
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